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Abstract
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance
when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di¤er in
income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social
insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is
actuarially fair.
The income-to-risk ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private
insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially,
private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private
insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for
social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level.
Keywords: long-term care, social insurance, familism, crowding out, weak
and strong prospects of family help, voting.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
While health care services aim at changing a health condition (from unwell to
well), long-term care (hereafter LTC) merely aims at making the current condition
(unwell) more bearable. Individuals need LTC due to disability, chronic condition,
trauma, or illness, which limit their ability to carry out basic self-care or personal
tasks that must be performed every day. Such activities are dened as activities
of daily living (eating, dressing, bathing, getting in and out of bed, toileting
and continence) or instrumental activities of daily living (preparing own meals,
cleaning, laundry, taking medication, getting to places beyond walking distance,
shopping, managing money a¤airs and using the telephone/Internet). A person
is dependent if he or she has limitations in either type.
Dependent people can draw on four di¤erent types of resources to help alleviate
their daily living problems. By far the most important quantitatively are their own
resources (self-insurance1, or savings) and family help (mainly through informal
help). Several countries also o¤er some form of social LTC insurance, although
the size of these programs is usually low, especially compared to the pension
programs. Finally, except for a handful of countries (such as the US and France),
private insurances role is negligible, and in any case consistently smaller than
that of the State.
Several articles have studied the interactions between some of these resources
(see the literature section hereunder). The value added by our paper is that it
considers simultaneously the four types of resources (family help, private, social
and self-insurance) and that it studies the political choice of the level of social LTC
insurance. More precisely, we study the determinants of the individual demand
(and political support) for social, private and self-insurance in an environment
where people di¤er in income, risk and availability of family help. As stated above,
the availability of family help is of rst importance for LTC, and distinguishes our
approach from the literature studying the political support for other kinds of social
insurance programs, such as health or social security.2
We develop a framework where agents live two periods. They earn an income,
pay taxes, save and buy private LTC insurance when young. Beyond income,
they also di¤er in the probability of becoming dependent when old, and in the
probability of receiving help from their family if dependent. They choose by
majority voting the value of the proportional income tax rate that nances the
1As other papers dealing with LTC (see Costa-Font 2010 for instance), we use the general
denition of self-insurance (assets set aside to cover possible losses) rather than the more specic
meaning used in insurance theory (prevention activities reducing the severity of the potential
loss).
2For instance, over 80% of dependent elderly live in their home or with their children, and
for these people most of the care is informal. See Stone (2000).
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lump sum social insurance transfer received if dependent. A crucial assumption
is that social LTC insurance redistributes across income and (ex ante) across risk,
while private insurance is actuarially fair and not redistributive. To level the
playing eld, both forms of insurance are equally e¢ cient (no loading factor, no
cost of public fund or distortionary impact from taxation).
While the endogenize the levels of the three types of insurance, family help is
modelled as an exogenous norm. This corresponds to what Costa-Font (2010) calls
familism, a short hand for familism culture, or the embeddedness in a familys
social norms (family ties)(p 2). Familism is exogenous because need of LTC is
a non-repeated experience in human life, and that individuals are arguably prone
to make decisions on the basis of intergenerational cultural values rather than
repeatedly experienced actions. More specically, parents tend to transfer their
values to their children (...), which includes cultural norms towards funding and
providing care in old age.(p 3). For simplicity, we do not model the distinction
between formal and informal help.
We rst study the individually most-preferred (self, private and social) in-
surance allocation of agents. We show that agents most-prefer either social or
private insurance, depending of their income-to-risk ratio. Whatever this ratio,
the support for their most-preferred insurance form decreases with the probabil-
ity of receiving family help. This is in line with the empirical results obtained by
Costa-Font (2010). We then introduce the distinction between weak and strong
prospect of family help: prospects are strong (resp., weak) for a given individual
if her expected marginal utility is lower (resp., higher) when she is dependent
with family as the only source of help (i.e., without any private or social insur-
ance handouts) than when she remains autonomous. Social insurance happens
to be more resilient than private insurance to family help, in the sense that no
one with strong prospects of family help most prefers any private insurance, while
some of these agents may still prefer a positive amount of social insurance. The
main driving force of this result is that strong prospects of family help cancel out
any need for an actuarially fair insurance like private insurance, while the (in-
come and risk) redistribution embedded into social insurance induces a positive
support from low income-to-risk agents. The larger support for social insurance
when prospects of family help are strong is in line with the stylized fact mentioned
in the introduction that social LTC insurance is more widespread worldwide and
larger than private insurance in the countries where they coexist (although both
are of a small size, which can be explained by our model as due to sizeable fam-
ily help). Our model also generates a novel testable implication regarding the
amount of self-insurance, which is not monotone in family help: it rst increases
with family help (as agents substitute more saving to less insurance) but then
decreases with family help when agents prefer self-insurance to any other form of
insurance.
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We then show that there exists a Condorcet winning level of social LTC insur-
ance (i.e., a level preferred by a majority of voters to any other level) even though
voters di¤er in three dimensions. Voterscharacteristics conducive to a positive
majority chosen level of social insurance are the existence of a large fraction of
agents with low income-to-risk ratios (so that the correlation between income and
risk does matter), and with weak prospects of family help. We nally study how
the availability of private insurance impacts the support for social LTC insurance.
This question is of interest as countries such as France are currently considering
how to facilitate the access to private LTC insurance. Moreover, as explained
below the literature has concentrated on the opposite relationship, namely the
impact of social on private insurance. We obtain that, even though both types
of insurance are substitutes, so that introducing private insurance decreases the
support for social insurance by some agents, the majority chosen level of social
insurance need not decrease. The intuition for this result is that only agents with
large income-to-risk ratios switch their preference from social to private insurance
when the latter is made available, and these agents may constitute a minority.
This will always be the case if agents do not di¤er in risk, because of the positive
skewness of the income distribution.
1.1 Literature
As mentioned above, a rich literature has studied the interactions between private,
social and self-insurance together with family help in the context of LTC. To the
best of our knowledge, no paper takes the four forms of resources into account
simultaneously.
Both Meier (1996) and Faber (1996) develop a two-period overlapping gen-
erations model where young individuals save and choose how much private LTC
insurance to buy. They study how these two decisions are a¤ected by various
institutional settings, such as pure private funding, social aid (where the public
sector pays the part of the cost of LTC that an individual cannot a¤ord), manda-
tory social insurance (funded or pay-as-you go) or obligatory minimum level of
private coverage. Their focus is on aggregate saving and private insurance by
a cohort, and they abstract both from family help and from the determination
of the type/size of public policy. They often obtain ambiguous results as to the
impact of the public policy on saving or private insurance.
Pauly (1990) studies various reasons why informed and risk averse agents do
not buy actuarially fair private LTC insurance. His main argument is that Med-
icaid crowds out the demand for private insurance, because it reimburses all LTC
costs (up to a threshold) once private funding is exhausted. Empirical evidence
does not appear to conrm this phenomenon (Norton, 1995; Brown and Finkel-
stein, 2007). Pauly (1990) also investigates the interactions between family help
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and private insurance. He shows that the concerns for not impoverishing ones
spouse and for leaving a bequest do not always generate a positive demand for
private LTC insurance. He also studies the manipulation of bequests in order
to incentivize children to provide informal help. His seminal approach has given
rise to several analytical analysis of this so-called intra-family moral hazard prob-
lem, by Courbage and Zweifel (2011) and Zweifel and Strüwe (1996, 1998) among
others. There seems to be little empirical support for intra-family moral hazard:
Sloan and Norton (1997) nd that the bequest motive does not inuence the
demand for private insurance in the US, while Mellor (2001) nds no evidence
consistent with the idea that the availability of caregivers discourages parents
from obtaining market-purchased LTC insurance. Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
rather nd support in French data for an altruistic motive since LTC insurance is
purchased not only to preserve bequests and to nancially protect families in the
event of disability, but also to reduce the burden of potential informal care givers.
All these papers either abstract from social insurance or take its characteristics
as exogenous. There is surprisingly little literature on the determination of the
(socially or individually) optimal level of social LTC insurance, especially when
compared with the related issues of health care, social security and annuities.3
On the normative side, Cremer and Pestieau (2011) use a model close to the
one of this paper; they show that the case for social LTC insurance can only be
defended when tax redistribution is restricted. On the positive side, Nuscheler
and Roeder (2013) study how the heterogeneity in individual income and risk
a¤ects the preferences for redistributive income taxation versus public nancing
of LTC. Their model allows LTC to be provided by informal help received from the
family, or through family transfers in cash and governments transfers. Insurance
(whether social, private or self-insurance in the form of saving) is not available
since voters know whether the elderly in the family is dependent or not when
taking their decisions. There is also no room for the correlation between income
and risk, since the proportion of dependent elderly is the same in the two income
classes considered. Their main result is the prediction of a negative correlation
between income inequality and public LTC spending. De Donder and Leroux
(2013) stress the behavioral biases exhibited by agents who vote for social LTC
insurance and buy LTC annuities, a nancial product that serves a higher transfer
if dependent than if not. Agents all have the same income and risk (there is no
family help) and di¤er in both the type and degree of myopia. They obtain that
the low demand for private insurance is better explained by underestimation of
the risk of becoming dependent than by procrastination.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the most-preferred social, private and self-insurance allocation of agents.
3The economic literature on various other aspects of LTC is surveyed in Cremer et al. (2009).
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Section 4 studies the majority-chosen value of the social insurance contribution
rate. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a continuum of individuals living two periods. When young, they
earn a wage, pay income taxes, save and buy private LTC insurance. When old,
they live out of their saving, plus the social and private insurance transfers if
they need LTC, plus a transfer from the family if they have caring children and
they need LTC. There are three sources of heterogeneity among individuals i: their
exogenous income, denoted by wi > 0, their probability of needing LTC (i 2]0; 1[)
and their probability of having (caring and close)4 children when needing LTC
(pi 2]0; 1[). An agent of type i is thus characterized by the triplet (wi; i; pi).
A young individual is lifetime utility function is given by
Ui = u(ci) + (1  i)u(si) + i [piH(dci) + (1  pi)H(dni )] : (1)
The rst term of (1) measures the instantaneous utility of individual i when young,
while the last two terms record his utility when old (for simplicity, we assume away
any discounting of future utility). First-period consumption is denoted by
ci = wi(1  )  si   ai;
where the rst term measures disposable income when young, with  a (propor-
tional) contribution rate on labor income. The second term si is private saving,
while ai denotes the amount of private LTC insurance bought.5
In the second period of life, we distinguish the utility function when au-
tonomous (with probability 1 i), denoted by u(:); from the utility when needing
LTC (with probability i), denoted by H(:). Agents have the same instantaneous
utility function u(:) when young and when old but autonomous. Both u(:) and
4There are many reasons why some parents cannot count on any assistance from their o¤-
spring: (i) they do not have children or their children prematurely died; (ii) their children are
not altruistic; (iii) they migrated far away from each other; (iv) parents and children do not get
along.
5We do not model the transfer made by some young agents to their dependent parents in
the rst period of their life. This is consistent with the assumption that LTC transfers are tax
deductible, or that they take the form of informal help that has as opportunity cost foregone
income on the labor market. In both these cases, the income wi is income net of LTC transfers
to parents. Introducing explicitly the LTC transfer to parents would add a fourth (and binary)
dimension of heterogeneity to our already complex model. Moreover, the role played by this
transfer would be very similar to the one played by income, so we would gain very little additional
insight.
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H(:) are increasing and concave functions of consumption. We assume that both
satisfy the condition of innite marginal utility for zero consumption levels. We
also assume that u(c) > H(c) for any consumption level c, but that u0(c) < H 0(c)
for all c: people are happier if not in need of LTC, but have a higher marginal
utility if dependent. Note that H(:) can be viewed as a reduced form of a utility
comprising both standard consumption and LTC spending. The assumption that
u0(c) < H 0(c) is satised by denition if the advent of dependency is associated ex-
clusively with nancial costs z, in which caseH(c) = u(c z). If dependency is also
characterized by a change in preferences, we enter the realm of state-dependent
utility functions. The assumption that u0(c) < H 0(c) may then be disputed (see,
for instance, Finkelstein et al. 2009, 2013), since some goods may substitute or
complement good health. Since our focus is on the nancial cost of dependency,
this assumption remains reasonable up to a certain consumption level, and we
implicitly assume in this paper that this consumption threshold is not reached.
Finally, observe that if dependent people do not have higher marginal utility than
when autonomous, then the lack of demand for (social and private) LTC insurance
is not puzzling at all.
With probability 1   i, the individual remains autonomous and enjoys his
saving (without loss of generality we posit a zero interest rate on savings). If
the individual becomes dependent (with probability i), his consumption level
depends on whether he receives help from his family. He does not receive such
help with probability 1  pi, in which case his consumption level is given by
dni = si + b+ xi;
where b denotes the social insurance transfer, and xi the private insurance transfer.
With probability pi, the dependent individual receives a transfer f from his family.
As explained in the introduction when discussing familism, we assume that f is
exogenously set by a social norm. We do not model the distinction between
formal and informal help, but rather measure f as the monetary value of all the
help received from the family. Consumption in that case is given by6
dci = si + b+ f + xi:
The social insurance lump sum transfer b paid to all dependent agents is -
nanced by the proportional tax  on rst-period labor income. For simplicity, we
assume away demographic (and economic) growth, so that the social insurance
programs budget constraint is given by
b = 
w

; (2)
6We do not model intra-family moral hazard, both for simplicity and because there is little
empirical support for this phenomenon (see the literature section in the introduction).
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where w is the average income and  is the average probability of needing LTC
(and thus, by the law or large numbers, the proportion of old individuals who
become dependent).
We model the private insurance scheme as actuarially fair: the premium does
not depend on income but is based on the individual risk i (which is assumed to
be observable by the insurer). Since LTC need is binary, there is no place for ex
post moral hazard. Also, we assume that insurers do not condition the payment
on the transfer made by children (for instance because they cannot observe it).
Individuals can choose the quantity of private insurance that they buy, as mea-
sured by the insurance premium ai paid in the rst period of life. In case they
need LTC, they then receive an actuarially fair amount
xi =
ai
i
:
The timing of the model runs as follows. Individuals rst choose the value
of  by majority voting. We assume that only young agents vote7 and that they
vote as if the result of the vote would continue to hold in the next period.8 They
then observe the result of the vote, and decide privately how much to save and to
privately insure against the risk of dependency. No decision is taken in the second
period of life.
3 Most-preferred public, private and self-insurance
allocation
We look for the most-preferred amounts of social, private and self insurance (re-
spectively denoted by  i , a

i and s

i ) of agents di¤ering in income wi, risk i and
family help pi. The respective rst-order conditions (FOCs) are9
FOC i : w
i


 wi
i

w
u0(ci) + EH 0i

 0; (3)
FOCai :  u0(ci) + EH 0i  0; (4)
FOCsi :  u0(ci) + (1  i)u0(si) + iEH 0i = 0; (5)
7In the absence of altruism, old agents are in favor of the value of  which maximizes the
transfer b if they need LTC (or if they do not know yet whether they will be dependent later),
and are indi¤erent as to the value of  if not dependent. Their preference over  thus does not
depend on their (wi; pi; i) characteristics, but simply on their dependency status. Allowing
old people to vote would then complexify the analysis without bringing any novel insight.
8This assumption is standard in the positive literature on pensions. See for instance
Casamatta et al. (2000)
9The fact that decisions are taken sequentially (rst  and then a and s) does not matter in
this section since we look at the most-preferred allocation of individual i.
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where
EH 0i = piH
0(si + b+
ai
i
+ f) + (1  pi)H 0(si + b+ ai
i
)
is the expected marginal utility in case of LTC of an agent of type i. Observe
that the formulation of the FOC for saving holds with equality thanks to the
assumption that limc!0u0 (c) = 1 (i.e., everyone saves a positive amount at his
optimum).
The following denition will prove helpful throughout the paper.
Denition 1 : The prospect of family help of agent i is weak if
(1  pi)H 0(x) + piH 0(x+ f) > u0(x);
and is strong otherwise.10
Family help may be weak either because the transfer f is low or because
the probability pi to receive it is low. More precisely, a su¢ cient (although not
necessary) condition for a weak family help prospect is that H 0(x + f) > u0(x).
If we assume that H(x) = u(x   z), this means that f < z: if dependency is
modelled as the equivalent of a monetary loss z, then the prospect of family help
is weak for all agents if the amount of help from the family, f , is lower than the
damage z. If f > z, the prospect of family help may be weak for individuals who
have a low probability pi of receiving it.
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) Agents never most-prefer at the same time positive amounts
of social and private insurance (i.e., ( i > 0, a

i > 0) is impossible), except if
wi=i = w= in which case agent i is indi¤erent between the two forms of insur-
ance, provided that they add to her most-preferred total insurance level.
(ii) Individuals with a weak prospect of family help prefer some social but no pri-
vate insurance (i.e.,  i > 0, a

i = 0) if wi=i < w=, and some private but no
social insurance (i.e.,  i = 0, a

i > 0) if wi=i > w=.
(iii) No individual with a strong prospect of family help prefers private insurance
(ai = 0 for all i). Also, such agents prefer some social insurance (i.e., 

i > 0)
if wi=i < ( w=)EH 0i=u
0(ci) < w=, and no social insurance at all (i.e.,  i = 0)
otherwise.
10We will assume for simplicity that the inequality has the same sign for all values of 0 <
x < wi. Although it need not be the case for all functions H(:) and u(:), it is of course true if
H(x) = u(x  z). Also, we take the functions H(:) and u(:) (and their curvature) as given and
concentrate on how family help a¤ects the comparison of expected marginal utilities.
8
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition for this proposition runs as follows. Comparing the FOCs for
social and private insurance ((3) and (4)), one immediately sees that agents prefer
to use social insurance if wi=i < w=, and private insurance otherwise. The
intuition for this result is that social insurance redistributes across income and
(ex ante) across risk levels, because the social insurance premium increases with
individual income while the LTC transfer does not, and because neither the social
premium nor the transfer are conditioned on the individual risk. At the same time,
private insurance is actuarially fair and does not redistribute across income levels.
Agents with a low income-to-risk ratio then prefer social to private insurance,
while agents with a large ratio prefer private to social insurance. Observe that
the threshold w= is independent (i) of family help both at the individual (pi)
and social (f) levels, and (ii) of the correlation between income and risk in society
(i.e., it is the ratio of average income to average risk, rather than the average ratio
of income-to-risk, that matters). The latter observation comes from the fact that
social insurance serves a lump sum transfer to dependent agents, with the transfer
increasing in the tax base (as measured by average income) and decreasing in the
proportion of recipients (which, by the law of large numbers, equals the average
risk of becoming dependent).
Proposition 1 also shows that everyone with a weak prospect of family help
most-prefers a positive amount of some form of insurance. Agents with a strong
prospect of family help have no need for any actuarially fair and non-redistributive
insurance, since their expected marginal utility if dependent is smaller than if
autonomous in the absence of insurance transfers. Such agents then do not buy
any private insurance (ai = 0), but they favor a positive social insurance level if
their income-to-risk ratio is small enough, compared to the ratio of average income
to average risk, that they benet a lot from the (risk or income) redistribution
embedded in the social insurance program. Observe that the threshold income-to-
risk ratio below which  i is positive depends on family help characteristics, since
it decreases with both pi and f . As the prospect of family help increases, agents
need to benet more from the redistributiveness of social insurance (thanks to a
low income-to-risk ratio) to favor a positive value of  .
We can then summarize the impact, at the extensive margin, of family help on
the preferences for social and private insurance. If the transfer f is low enough that
the prospect for family help is weak for all agents, then family help has no impact
on whether agents prefer a positive amount of social or of private insurance. If f
is large enough that the family help prospects are strong for at least some agents
(with large values of pi), then family help totally crowds out support for private
insurance among these agents, and also totally crowds out the support for social
insurance for these agents whose ratio of income to risk is slightly lower than the
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ratio of average income to average risk.
In order to complete this picture of the crowding out e¤ects of family help on
the support for insurance, we now proceed to the comparative static analysis of
the most-preferred amount of insurance and of saving. We rst study the group
of agents who most-prefer a positive amount of social insurance.
We introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion R(ci) =  ciu00(ci)=u0(ci)
is low:
u0(ci) + wiu00(ci) > 0
, R(ci) < ci
wi
< 1:
Note that this assumption is slightly stronger than the assumption thatR(ci) <
1 since wi > ci.11 As we will see shortly, this assumption is used only as a su¢ cient
(although not necessary) condition to ensure that the derivative of the most-
preferred social insurance contribution rate with respect to income is negative.
Proposition 2 Take the individuals with ai = 0 while 

i > 0 (and s

i > 0). We
obtain that
(i) a larger income wi increases si and decreases 

i , under Assumption 1;
(ii) a larger family help (either pi or f) increases si and decreases 

i ;
(iii) a larger risk i decreases si and increases 

i .
Proof: Repeated use of Cramers rule - see Appendix.
Before giving the intuition for these results, it is worth emphasizing that,
although the ratio wi=i determines whether agent i prefers social to private in-
surance, it does not determine the value of   by itself. For instance, two agents
with the same value of the ratio will typically prefer di¤erent values of   if they
di¤er in w,  or p.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, observe rst that saving
and social insurance are (imperfect) substitutes (since they constitute two tech-
nologies to move resources from the present into the future), so that increasing
one exogenously decreases the most-preferred level of the other, ceteris paribus.
11In a recent paper studying the LTC insurance market, Karagyozova and P. Siegelman (2012)
surveys the empirical literature on relative risk aversion. They report very large ranges for
empirically plausible individual values of R: from [0.35, 1] for Hansen and Singleton (1993) to
[0.029, 680] for Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). Holt and Laury (2002) estimates that two thirds
of respondents in their study have a value of R between 0.15 and 0.93. Assumption 1 then seems
reasonable.
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Then, each individual characteristic (income, family or risk) impacts a decision
( i or s

i ) directly, but also indirectly through its impact on the other decision.
We start with the impact of income, noting that wi plays a role only in the
rst period of life, since no transfer is conditioned on income when old. An in-
crease in individual income has two direct e¤ects on  i : it makes social insurance
more expensive (by increasing the tax payment), but it also decreases the mar-
ginal utility of rst-period consumption (and thus the marginal utility cost of the
social insurance transfer). If marginal utility does not decrease too fast (i.e., if
Assumption 1 holds), the rst impact is larger than the second and the net direct
e¤ect of an increase in income is to decrease  i . The only direct impact of a larger
income on the saving decision is the lower marginal utility from rst-period con-
sumption, which increases the optimal saving amount si . We then have that the
direct and indirect e¤ects of an increase in income reinforce themselves: a larger
income decreases  i directly but also indirectly because it makes saving more at-
tractive. Likewise, a larger income increases saving directly but also indirectly by
discouraging social insurance.
The impact of family help (measured by either pi or f) runs as follows. In-
creasing family help decreases the expected marginal utility in case of dependency
(because of a larger consumption level when help is received if f increases, and
because of a larger weight on the state of the world where help is received, and
thus marginal utility lower, if pi increases). This exerts a negative direct impact
on both  i and s

i , since ceteris paribus it decreases the marginal utility benet
from transferring income into the future in both cases. On the other hand, in-
direct e¤ects have the opposite sign: the decrease in incentives to save tend to
increase the incentive to favor social insurance, while the decrease in incentives to
insure tends to increase the incentive to save. We obtain that the direct e¤ect is
larger than the indirect for social insurance, while the opposite occurs for saving.
Intuitively, increases in pi or f weaken the expected marginal utility if dependent,
and thus decrease the desire to insure as measured by  i . This in turn decreases
the marginal utility from rst-period consumption, and pushes the individual to
save more. In other words, more family help decreases the expected marginal util-
ity when dependent compared to being non dependent, and leads the individual
to reallocate his portfolio in favor of saving and against social insurance.
A larger individual risk i directly increases  i since it raises the probability
to receive the social insurance transfer without a¤ecting its tax price. The direct
e¤ect of a larger i on si is more di¢ cult to ascertain. It hinges on how the
expected marginal utility when old varies when agents put more relative weight
on being dependent. We know from the decision not to buy private insurance
that expected marginal utility if dependent is lower than rst-period marginal
utility. Saving then ensures that marginal utility in the rst period is a convex
combination of marginal utility if dependent and if not. We then obtain that
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marginal utility if autonomous is larger than if dependent, so that increasing i
actually decreases the expected marginal utility in second period, inducing the
agent to save less. Observe that the indirect e¤ects then reinforce the direct
e¤ects: a larger individual risk pushes directly the agent to insure more and save
less, the latter reinforcing his incentive to insure more, while the former reinforces
his incentive to save less.
We now consider the agents who most-prefer a positive amount of private
insurance.
Proposition 3 Take the individuals with  i = 0 while a

i > 0 (and s

i > 0). We
obtain that
(i) a larger income wi increases si and has an ambiguous e¤ect on a

i ;
(ii) a larger family help (either pi or f) increases si and decreases a

i ;
(iii) a larger risk i decreases si and increases a

i .
Proof : Repeated use of Cramers rule - see Appendix.
Agents with a larger income wi have a lower marginal utility from rst-period
consumption, which gives them more incentive to buy insurance and to save: the
direct impact of wi on both ai and s

i is positive. The indirect impact then goes
into the opposite direction (since more saving induces to buy less insurance, while
buying more insurance induces to save less). We show in the Appendix that the
direct e¤ect is unambiguously larger than the indirect one for saving, so that si
increases with wi. As for insurance, the sign of the aggregate impact of wi depends
on how saving a¤ects the di¤erential of second-period (expected) marginal utility
according to dependency status. If more saving increases expected marginal utility
when dependent compared to when autonomous, then richer agents buy more
insurance. They buy less insurance in the opposite case.12
The sign of the impact of family help (as measured by either f or pi) on ai
and si is the same as on 

i and s

i as explained in Proposition 2, and the intuition
is similar.
By contrast, the channels through which a higher individual risk i impacts
the most-preferred amount of private insurance and saving di¤er totally from
the case studied in Proposition 2. Observe that, when ai > 0 and s

i > 0, we
have that u0(si) = u0(ci) = EH 0i, so that putting more relative weight on the
dependency state does not a¤ect the expected marginal utility when old. At
the same time, increasing i decreases the return from private insurance and
thus lowers consumption levels (and increases marginal utility) when dependent.
This direct impact of increasing i then increases the willingness both to insure
privately and to save. On the other hand, indirect e¤ects have the opposite sign:
the increase in incentives to save tend to decrease the incentive to buy private
12In the special case where H(x) = u(x  z), we obtain that dai =dw = 0.
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insurance, while the increase in incentives to insure tends to decrease the incentive
to save. We obtain that the direct e¤ect is larger than the indirect one for private
insurance, while the opposite holds for saving. Intuitively, raising i increases the
expected marginal utility if dependent, and thus increases ai . This in turn raises
the marginal utility from rst-period consumption, and pushes the individual to
save less. In other words, a larger individual risk increases the expected marginal
utility when dependent, and leads the individual to reallocate his portfolio in favor
of private insurance and against saving.
We now put together the three propositions and summarize how individual
characteristics a¤ect separately the preferences for saving as well as social and
private insurance, starting with income. Figure 1 shows the most-preferred levels
of saving, social and private LTC insurance as functions of individual income.13
To facilitate the comparisons between the three schedules, we measure all three
in terms of the amounts of transfer provided in the second period: b( i ) for social
insurance, xi(ai ) for private insurance and s

i for saving. An individual with a
very low income most-favors a positive amount of social insurance, because he
benets from the income redistribution, but no private insurance. He also saves
a positive amount. As income increases,  i decreases while s

i increases.
14 If this
individual has a weak prospect of family help, the decline in  i as wi increases
continues up to the point where wi=i = w=. At this point, the agent shifts his
support from social to private insurance (i.e.,  i = 0 while a

i > 0).
15 From that
point on, any increase in wi has an ambiguous impact on ai .
16 By continuity,
si increases with wi whether the agent prefers social or private insurance. If the
agent rather enjoys a strong prospect of family help, his most-preferred value of
 i reaches zero for a value of wi that is such that wi=i < w=. From that point
on, the individual favors no insurance whatsoever. His preferred amount of saving
increases with income in all cases.
Insert Figure 1 here
13Figures 1 to 3 are drawn under the assumptions that u(x) = Log(x), that H(x) = u(x  z)
and, for Figures 1 and 2, that prospects of family help are weak. The analysis provided in the
text is general and does not rely on such assumptions.
14Observe that this is true on Figure 1 even though the logarithmic utility function on which it
is based does not satisfy Assumption 1. This illustrates that Assumption 1 is a su¢ cient although
not necessary condition to obtain the comparative statics analysis described in Proposition 2
(i).
15More precisely, an agent with wi=i = w= is indi¤erent between using private or social
insurance, as long as the insurance transfer he receives when dependent corresponds to his
optimal level.
16As stated in footnote 12, with H(x) = u(x  z), ai > 0 is constant with wi: see Figure 1.
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We perform the same exercise for the individual risk. It will prove easier to
treat separately the case of weak and strong family help prospects. With weak
family help prospects (see Figure 2), agents with very low values of i prefer
some private insurance,17 with ai increasing with i. When wi=i = w= is
reached, they stop buying private insurance and rather switch to a strictly positive
amount of social insurance. As i further increases,  i increases as well. Saving s

i
decreases with i whether  i > 0 (see Proposition 2) or a

i > 0 (see Proposition 3).
With strong family help prospects, agents never buy private insurance whatever
their individual risk i. They most-prefer no social insurance as well, until their
risk is large enough that wi=i is su¢ ciently small (and denitely smaller than
w=) that they gain enough from the ex ante redistribution across risk levels to
favor  i > 0. From that point on, 

i increases with i. Also, s

i decreases with i
throughout with strong family help.
Insert Figure 2 here
We now turn to the impact of family help, as measured by pi (we obtain similar
results when varying f). Figure 3A illustrates the results when wi=i < w=
while Figure 3B assumes that wi=i > w=. A very low value of pi means that
the prospects of family help are weak for the individual. He then favors either
 i > 0 if wi=i < w= or a

i > 0 if wi=i > w=. Increasing pi then decreases
 i (Fig. 3A) or a

i (Fig 3B), and increases s

i . If wi=i > w=, then a

i converges
to zero when pi is large enough that prospects of family help turn from weak to
strong.18 If wi=i < w=,  i remains positive even for strong prospects of family
help (thanks to income and risk redistribution), but decreases with pi until it
becomes nil. When pi is large enough that ai = 

i = 0 (on either Fig. 3A or
3B), si decreases with pi because a higher probability of family help decreases the
expected marginal utility in the second period, and thus the expected benet from
saving. We then obtain that saving is not monotone in family help when agents
endogenously switch from some (social or private) insurance to no insurance at
all at their most-preferred allocation.19
Insert Figures 3A and 3B here
17This is reminiscent of the well known result (see Mossin (1968)) that risk-averse agents
always wish to buy actuarially fair insurance.
18To cover all cases, we assume that f is large enough that prospects of family help become
strong when pi becomes large enough.
19As announced in the introduction, these results provide an analytical underpinning to those
obtained by Costa-Font (2010): compare our Figures 3A and 3B with Costa-Fonts Figure 6.
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To summarize, we obtain that having weak prospects of family help is a nec-
essary condition to most-prefer a positive amount of private insurance. In that
case, agents with large income and low individual risk buy private insurance. The
most-preferred amount of private insurance increases with risk. On the other
hand, low income and large risk individuals favor a larger social insurance pro-
gram. In terms of crowding out e¤ects, we then obtain that family support (as
measured by either f or pi) decreases the support for both types of insurance.20
Such strong prospects for a large part of the polity may then explain the puzzle
of the generalized lack of private insurance in OECD countries. Social insurance
is less a¤ected by family help thanks to the redistribution (across income and risk
levels) that it entails. On a more prospective note, the decrease in family help
that is widely expected to happen should give a boost to social and especially to
private insurance, according to our model.
Before turning to the majority-chosen amount of social insurance, we should
stress two limitations of the comparative static analysis we have performed. First,
we have looked at variations of individual characteristics that a¤ect a set of mea-
sure zero of individuals. This is of no import for family help, where the distribution
of pis plays no role for individual preferences, so that the comparative static re-
sults we have obtained can be generalized when the characteristics of a set of
positive measure of agents are changed. Unfortunately, we cannot proceed in the
same way for variations of wi and i for a group of agents when such variations
a¤ect w and ; because of the role that average income and risk play in the gov-
ernments budget balance equation (2). While we have shown that the individual
impact of increasing wi on  i is negative, any increase in the income of a group of
agents that raises the average income w would add another e¤ect in the opposite
direction since a larger tax base would increase the return of the social insurance
scheme. Likewise, the individual impact of increasing i on  i is positive, while
an increase in i for several agents that would raise  adds a countervailing force
on  i by decreasing the return of the social insurance scheme.
The second limitation of Propositions 2 and 3 is that we assume that individual
characteristics are modied one at a time (i.e., independently from one another).
In reality, these individual characteristics are correlated. Observe that, if richer
people tend to live longer and hence to have a larger probability of needing LTC
(i.e., cov(w; ) > 0), then the net impact of a higher wi coupled with a higher
20When p and f are low enough that prospects of family help are weak, they crowd out the
demand for social insurance by low wi=i types and for private insurance by large wi=i types.
The crowding out is exclusively at the intensive margin, since the threshold value of wi=i (equal
to w=) which determines whether agents prefer social or private insurance is not a¤ected by
f or p. When p and f are large enough that prospects of family help are strong, demand for
private insurance disappears. From that point on, any increase in family help crowds out the
demand for social insurance both at the intensive and at the extensive margins.
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i on si and 

i is ambiguous. Whether one impact is larger than the other one
is essentially an empirical matter of both the intensity of the correlation and the
amount of variance in the two characteristics. For instance, if (as we surmise),
the variance in income levels is larger than the variance in the risk levels (or if
the covariance between both is low), then, under Assumption 1, richer people will
favor a lower social insurance contribution rate (even though they may be riskier
than poorer people).
Income may also be correlated with the probability of receiving family help,
but the sign of the correlation is far from clear. Using macro data in Europe, one
observes a negative correlation between income and family support, with richer
Northern European countries providing less family help, on average, than poorer
Southern countries (the so-called North-South gradient, see SHARE (2005)).
Focusing on micro data, Bonsang (2009) nds a positive correlation between in-
come and family help. With a positive correlation, we obtain unambiguously that
richer people prefer less social insurance, while the relationship between income
and most-preferred social insurance can go both ways with a negative correlation
between income and family support.
We now move to the majority-chosen level of social insurance.
4 The majority-chosen level of social insurance
Young agents vote rst over  and then choose a and s. When assessing their
preferences over  , we can make use of the envelope theorem for the choices of
a and s. Di¤erentiating (3) with respect to  , it is straightforward to see that
preferences over  are concave (and thus single-peaked), so that we can apply the
median voter theorem and obtain that there exists a value of  that is preferred
by a majority of voters to any other value of  . We denote this majority-chosen
level of  by V . It corresponds to the value of  that is such that at least half the
polity exhibits  i  V while at least half is such that  i  V . Since individuals
di¤er in three dimensions, it is not possible at this level of generality to dene the
characteristics of the decisive voters. But this will not prevent us from obtaining
several interesting results.
First, observe that the set of agents who favor  i > 0 is made of all agents
i with wi=i < w= and a weak prospect of family help together with all agents
i with a strong prospect of family help and a value of wi=i lower than some
threshold that is itself strictly lower than w=. If the mass of those two types of
agents is at least equal to one half, then V is strictly positive.
Second, from the discussion at the end of the previous section, we obtain
that V weakly decreases with family help. Unfortunately, as explained above,
we can not draw similar inferences for variations in income and in risk. Also,
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it is impossible at this level of generality to assess the impact of modifying the
correlation between, say, income and risk, or income and family help, on V .
In the introduction, we have mentioned that the literature has assessed how
social insurance may decrease the demand for private insurance. Since several
countries are currently considering how to facilitate access to private LTC insur-
ance, we now study how the availability of private insurance impacts the support
for social insurance. It is easy to see from the FOCs (3) and (4) that the two forms
of insurance are imperfect substitutes. The intuition may then suggest that intro-
ducing the possibility to buy private insurance in a society where such insurance
did not exist previously would always decrease the support for social insurance
and result in a lower value of V . The next proposition shows that this need not
be the case.
Proposition 4 If the proportion of individuals who face weak family prospects
and are such that wi=i > w= is lower than one half, then the introduction of
the possibility to buy private insurance does not a¤ect the majority-chosen value
of the social insurance contribution rate, V .
The intuition for this proposition is that agents prefer either social or private
insurance, but never both, so that introducing private insurance either does not
change an individuals most-preferred value of  , or drives it to zero. Observe
rst that individuals who have strong prospects of family help never buy private
insurance at their most-preferred allocation, so that introducing this form of in-
surance does not a¤ect their preferences for social insurance. Among the agents
who face weak prospects of family help, those with a ratio of income-to-risk lower
than w= prefer social to private insurance, so that their most-preferred value of
 is not a¤ected by the presence of private insurance. In other words, only agents
facing weak prospects of family help and with a ratio of income-to-risk larger
than w= react to the o¤ering of private insurance by decreasing (to zero) their
most-preferred amount of social insurance. Moreover, not all agents with a ratio
wi=i larger than w= may prefer a strictly positive value of   in the absence of
private insurance (because agents with a very large value of wi=i may prefer to
self-insure rather than buy into a social insurance program that heavily redistrib-
utes against them, as can be inferred from the FOC (6)). Hence, the condition
detailed in Proposition 4 is su¢ cient but not necessary.
How likely is this su¢ cient condition to be satised? Observe that it is always
empirically satised when agents do not di¤er in risk i. In that case, the crucial
threshold is w, and we know that wmed < w in all countries so that the condition
is satised even if the prospects of family help are weak for all agents (see Figures
4A and 4B). The su¢ cient condition will remain empirically valid if the variance
of the income distribution is, as we surmise, much larger than the variance of the
risk distribution.
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Insert Figures 4A and 4B
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of the demand for private, social and
self-insurance for LTC in an environment where individuals di¤er in earnings,
family support and dependence risk. We can use the results of our analysis to
try and shed light on the future development of the three types of insurance for
LTC. The two main changes expected to a¤ect LTC in the near future are (i) the
doubling in the number of dependent individuals in the next twenty years within
the OECD, associated with the rapid increase of very old (75+) people in the
population, and (ii) the decline in family solidarity due to increased participation
of women in the labor market, increased mobility and changing family values. The
rst e¤ect can be modelled in our setting as an increase in the risk of becoming
dependent of all agents. This higher risk will undoubtedly increase the needs when
old, but we obtain that it does not necessarily imply an increase in the demand for
social insurance, because a larger average risk of becoming dependent decreases the
return of the social LTC insurance. Observe that the return of the (actuarially fair)
private insurance decreases with the individual risk, while self-insurance return is
not a¤ected. The impact of a larger aggregate risk on the demand for social
insurance thus depends on its distribution across people, and especially on its
correlation with income. The impact of a diminishing family support is easier to
ascertain: as we show, it unambiguously increases the demand for social insurance
among agents with a low income-to-risk ratio. As for individuals with a high
ratio, a decrease in family help will rst increase their self-insurance level, and
then increase their demand for private insurance.
Our paper introduces an admittedly crude modelling of family help, in that
the amount of help is dictated by a social norm, with no distinction between
formal and informal help. The next step in our research agenda is to lift those
two constraints in order to better understand the demand for social and private
LTC insurance as a function, for instance, of the substitutability/complementarity
between formal and informal help (see Van Houtven and Norton, 2008).
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Observe from the FOC for ai that ai > 0 implies that EH
0
i = u
0(ci).
This in turn implies that FOC i > 0 if wi=i < w=, an impossibility, and that
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FOC i < 0 if wi=i > w=, so that  i = 0. In the latter case, the FOC for
saving implies that EH 0i = u
0(si) = u0(ci), which is compatible with the starting
assumption that ai > 0.
Similarly, observe from the FOC for  i that  i > 0 implies that EH
0
i =
wi
i

w
u0(ci). If wi=i > w=, we then obtain that EH 0i > u
0(ci) and so that
FOCai > 0, an impossibility. On the other hand, if wi=i < w=, we have that
EH 0i < u
0(ci) and that FOCai < 0, implying that ai = 0. Finally, it is obvious
that wi=i = w= is indi¤erent between a and  , provided that EH 0i = u
0(ci)i.e.,
that they obtain their most-preferred total insurance amount.
(ii) We rst show that people buy either private or social insurance with weak
family help i.e., that ai = 

i = 0 is impossible. In that case, with a

i = 

i = 0,
by the FOC for saving, we would have EH 0i > u
0(ci) > u0(si), which in turn would
imply that FOCai > 0, a contradiction with ai = 0. The proof of part (i) has
then shown that we have ai > 0 and 

i = 0 when wi=i > w=, and a

i = 0 and
 i > 0 when wi=i < w=:
(iii) With strong family help, when ai = 

i = 0, by the FOC for saving, we
have EH 0i  u0(ci)  u0(si), which in turn implies that FOCai  0, consistent
with ai = 0. We then have that FOC i  0 for  i = 0 provided that wi=i 
x = ( w=)EH 0i=u
0(ci) , with x  w= since EH 0i  u0(ci). If wi=i < x, then we
obtain that FOC i > 0 at  = 0, which is inconsistent with  i = 0. Observe
that EH 0i decreases with  i while u
0(ci) increases with  i. Take then the value of
 i > 0 such that the FOC for  equals zero. Observe that EH
0
i  u0(si) holds a
fortiori when  > 0 while prospects of family help are strong. Hence, from the
FOC for saving, we still have that EH 0i  u0(ci)  u0(si) and thus that the FOC
for ai is negative: we have just shown that ( i > 0; a

i = 0) is consistent with the
three FOCs.
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Proof of Proposition 2 (for the benet of the referees, but could be
deleted from the published article)
In that case, with ai = 0, the FOCs (3) and (5) simplify to
FOC i :  wiu0(ci) + w

iEH
0
i = 0 (6)
FOCsi :  u0(ci) + (1  i)u0(si) + iEH 0i = 0; (7)
where
ci = wi(1   i)  si and
EH 0i = piH
0(si +  i
w

+ f) + (1  pi)H 0(si +  i w

):
Straightforward application of the implicit function theorem on the system
given by the FOCs (6) and (7) gives the following results.
(i)
d i
dw
s
=
@FOC i
@si
@FOCsi
@wi
  @FOC i
@wi
@FOCsi
@si
< 0
since
@FOC i
@si
= wiu
00(ci) +
w

iEH
00
i < 0;
@FOCsi
@wi
=  (1  )u00(ci) > 0;
@FOC i
@wi
=  u0(ci)  wi(1  )u00(c) < 0 under Assumption 1,
@FOCsi
@si
= u00(ci) + (1  i)u00(si) + iEH 00i < 0:
Likewise,
dsi
dw
s
=
@FOCsi
@ i
@FOC i
@wi
  @FOCsi
@wi
@FOC i
@ i
> 0
since
@FOCsi
@ i
=
@FOC i
@si
< 0;
@FOC i
@ i
= w2i u
00(ci) + (
w

)2iEH
00
i < 0:
(ii)
d i
dpi
s
=
@FOC i
@si
@FOCsi
@pi
  @FOC i
@pi
@FOCsi
@si
7 0;
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since
@FOCsi
@pi
= i
h
H 0i(si +  i
w

+ f) H 0i(si +  i
w

)
i
< 0;
@FOC i
@pi
=
w

i
h
H 0i(si +  i
w

+ f) H 0i(si +  i
w

)
i
< 0.
Using the fact that
@FOC i
@pi
=
w

@FOCsi
@pi
;
we obtain
d i
dpi
s
=
@FOCsi
@pi

@FOC i
@si
  w

@FOCsi
@si

=
@FOCsi
@pi
h
u00(ci)

w   w


  w

(1  i)u00(si)
i
< 0;
since w

< w

:
Likewise,
dsi
dpi
s
=
@FOCsi
@ i
@FOC i
@pi
  @FOCsi
@pi
@FOC i
@ i
7 0:
Using the fact that
@FOC i
@pi
=
w

@FOCsi
@pi
;
we obtain
dsi
dpi
s
=
@FOCsi
@pi

w

@FOCsi
@ i
  @FOC i
@ i

=
@FOCsi
@pi
h
u00(ci)
 w

wi   (wi)2
i
> 0;
since w < w

< w

:
Also, we have that
d i
df
s
=
@FOC i
@si
@FOCsi
@f
  @FOC i
@f
@FOCsi
@si
;
with
@FOCsi
@f
= ipiH
00
i (si + 
w

+ f) < 0;
@FOC i
@f
=
w

ipiH
00
i (si + 
w

+ f) < 0.
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Using the fact that
@FOC i
@f
=
w

@FOCsi
@f
;
we obtain
d i
df
s
=
@FOCsi
@f

@FOC i
@si
  w

@FOCsi
@si

< 0:
Likewise,
dsi
df
s
=
@FOCsi
@ i
@FOC i
@f
  @FOCsi
@f
@FOC i
@ i
7 0:
Using the fact that
@FOC i
@f
=
w

@FOCsi
@f
;
we obtain
dsi
df
s
=
@FOCsi
@f

w

@FOCsi
@ i
  @FOC i
@ i

> 0:
(iii)
d i
di
s
=
@FOC i
@si
@FOCsi
@i
  @FOC i
@i
@FOCsi
@si
> 0;
since
@FOC i
@i
=
w

EH 0i > 0,
@FOCsi
@i
= EH 0i   u0(si) < 0;
where, to sign the latter, we make use of the fact that ai < 0; which implies that
EH 0i < u
0(ci), and by the FOC for saving that EH 0i < u
0(ci) < u0(si).
Likewise, we obtain that
dsi
di
s
=
@FOCsi
@ i
@FOC i
@i
  @FOCsi
@i
@FOC i
@ i
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 3 (could be deleted from published article as
well)
In that case, with  i = 0, the FOCs (4) and (5) simplify to
FOCai :  u0(ci) + EH 0i = 0 (8)
FOCsi :  u0(ci) + (1  i)u0(si) + iEH 0i = 0; (9)
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where
ci = wi   si   ai and
EH 0i = piH
0(si +
ai
i
+ f) + (1  pi)H 0(si + ai
i
):
Straightforward application of the implicit function theorem on the system
given by the FOCs (8) and (9) gives the following results.
(i)
dai
dw
s
=
@FOCai
@si
@FOCsi
@wi
  @FOCai
@wi
@FOCsi
@si
7 0;
since
@FOCai
@si
= u00(ci) + EH 00i < 0;
@FOCsi
@wi
=  u00(ci) > 0;
@FOCai
@wi
=  u0(ci) > 0;
@FOCsi
@si
= u00(ci) + (1  i)u00(si) + iEH 00i < 0:
Using the fact that
@FOCai
@wi
=
@FOCsi
@wi
;
we obtain
dai
dwi
s
=
@FOCai
@wi

@FOCai
@si
  @FOCsi
@si

=
@FOCai
@wi
[(1  i) (EH 00i   u00(si))] 7 0:
Likewise,
dsi
dw
s
=
@FOCsi
@ai
@FOCai
@wi
  @FOCsi
@wi
@FOCai
@ai
7 0;
since
@FOCsi
@ai
=
@FOCai
@si
< 0;
@FOCai
@ai
= u00(ci) +
EH 00i
i
< 0;
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Using the fact that
@FOCai
@wi
=
@FOCsi
@wi
;
we obtain
dsi
dwi
s
=
@FOCai
@wi

@FOCsi
@ai
  @FOCai
@ai

=
@FOCai
@wi

(1  1
i
)EH 00i

> 0:
(ii)
dai
dpi
s
=
@FOCai
@si
@FOCsi
@pi
  @FOCai
@pi
@FOCsi
@si
7 0;
since
@FOCsi
@pi
= i

H 0i(si +
ai
i
+ f) H 0i(si +
ai
i
)

< 0;
@FOCai
@pi
= H 0i(si +
ai
i
+ f) H 0i(si +
ai
i
) < 0.
Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@pi
= i
@FOCai
@pi
;
we obtain
dai
dpi
s
=
@FOCai
@pi

i
@FOCai
@si
  @FOCsi
@si

=  @FOCai
@pi
[(1  i) (u00(ci) + u00(si))] < 0:
Likewise,
dsi
dpi
s
=
@FOCsi
@ai
@FOCai
@pi
  @FOCsi
@pi
@FOCai
@ai
7 0:
Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@pi
= i
@FOCai
@pi
;
we obtain
dsi
dpi
s
=
@FOCai
@pi

@FOCsi
@ai
  i@FOCai
@ai

=
@FOCai
@pi
[(1  i)u00(ci)] > 0:
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Also, we have that
dai
df
s
=
@FOCai
@si
@FOCsi
@f
  @FOCai
@f
@FOCsi
@si
7 0;
since
@FOCsi
@f
= ipiH
00
i (si +
ai
i
+ f) < 0;
@FOCai
@f
= piH
00
i (si +
ai
i
+ f) < 0.
Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@f
= i
@FOCai
@f
;
we obtain
dai
df
s
=
@FOCai
@f

i
@FOCai
@si
  @FOCsi
@si

< 0:
Likewise,
dsi
df
s
=
@FOCsi
@ai
@FOCai
@f
  @FOCsi
@f
@FOCai
@ai
7 0:
Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@f
= i
@FOCai
@f
;
we obtain
dsi
df
s
=
@FOCai
@f

@FOCsi
@ai
  i@FOCai
@ai

> 0:
(iii)
dai
di
s
=
@FOCai
@si
@FOCsi
@i
  @FOCai
@i
@FOCsi
@si
7 0;
since
@FOCai
@i
=  aiEH
00
i
i
> 0;
@FOCsi
@i
= EH 0i   u0(si)  i
aiEH
00
i
i
=  aiEH
00
i
i
> 0;
since EH 0i = u
0(si) when ai > 0 and s

i > 0. Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@i
= i
@FOCai
@i
;
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we obtain
dai
di
s
=
@FOCai
@i

i
@FOCai
@si
  @FOCsi
@si

> 0:
Likewise,
dsi
di
s
=
@FOCsi
@ai
@FOCai
@i
  @FOCsi
@i
@FOCai
@ai
7 0:
Using the fact that
@FOCsi
@i
= i
@FOCai
@i
;
we obtain
dsi
di
s
=
@FOCai
@i

@FOCsi
@ai
  i@FOCai
@ai

< 0:
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Figure 1 : Social, private and self-insurance transfers as functions of 
with weak prospect of family help, logarithmic utility and ( ) ( )x u x z  
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Figure 2 : Social, private and self-insurance transfers as functions of       
with weak prospect of family help, logarithmic utility and ( ) ( )x u x z  
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Figure 3 A : Social and self-insurance transfers as a function of           
with , logarithmic utility and
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Figure 3 B : Private and self-insurance transfers as a function of              
with , logarithmic utility and
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Figure 4A : Majority-chosen value of       without private insurance when
agents differ only in income
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Figure 4B : Majority-chosen value of       with private insurance when agents 
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